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INTRODUCTION 
During the late nineteenth century, law in the United States 
began to develop into a field worthy of study at the university.1 
Rather than learning law in the law office, the traditional method 
for entry into the legal field in the States,2 the prospective lawyer 
could learn law within the institution of higher education. Indeed, 
the university provided a means of converting law from a trade 
into a profession. 
                                                                                                             
 *  Associate Professor of Law, Barry University. B.A. (summa cum laude), 
Communication and English, California State University, Stanislaus, 1999; J.D., 
University of the Pacific, 2002; M.A., Communication, University of Utah, 2003; Ph.D., 
Communication, University of Utah, 2005. The author is a member of the State Bar of 
California. For insightful feedback on prior versions of this Article, the author thanks 
David J. Vergobbi of the University of Utah, Lisa Flores of the University of Colorado 
at Boulder, Wayne McCormack of the University of Utah, Tarla Rai Peterson of Texas 
A&M University, and Richard D. Rieke of the University of Utah. 
 1 ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S 
TO THE 1980S 36 (1983). 
 2 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 278 (1973). In England, 
training for entry into the legal field also had been practical in nature. The Inns of 
Court in London, which were separate from the universities like Oxford and 
Cambridge, provided such training. Id. at 20. 
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Earlier scholarship has explained how, between 1870 and 
1920, some lawyers used rhetoric3 to construct a scholarly role, or 
persona, appropriate for the law professor situated within the U.S.  
university.4 This scholar persona had multiple dimensions that 
included (1) an almost exclusive professional commitment, (2) 
teaching duties, (3) the production of research, and (4) a public 
function.5 The scholar persona contrasted sharply with the 
practitioner persona of the law professor that other lawyers 
advocated. The primary claims in support of the latter persona 
were (1) that law was a practical subject that called for practical 
training and (2) that only an individual with practical background 
was well-suited for assuming the law professor persona.6 
Rhetorical conflict between these competing views resulted. 
By the early 1920s, law schools had established themselves 
as the main portals of entry into the legal field in the United 
States. Even a decade earlier, most of the individuals admitted to 
the bar had gone to law school.7 Meanwhile, law office study “was 
traveling the long dusty road to extinction.”8 “The American law 
professor [was becoming] American legal education,”9 and the 
scholar model of the law professor had been spreading to the 
nation’s major universities at least since the dawn of the new 
century.10 The legal field was undergoing a process of  
professionalization. 
                                                                                                             
 3 The term rhetoric refers to communication, which itself refers to human symbol 
use. SONJA K. FOSS & KAREN A. FOSS, INVITING TRANSFORMATION: PRESENTATIONAL 
SPEAKING FOR A CHANGING WORLD 4 (2d ed. 2003). This Article focuses on rhetoric that 
is persuasive in nature. See ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 
36 (George A. Kennedy trans., 1991). 
 4 See generally Carlo A. Pedrioli, Constructing Modern-Day U.S. Legal Education 
with Rhetoric: Langdell, Ames, and the Scholar Model of the Law Professor Persona, 66 
RUTGERS L.J. 55 (2014). For a discussion of legal education and the role of the law 
professor in continental Europe, England, and the United States before 1870, see id. at 
59-62. 
 5 Id. at 69-70. 
 6 Id. at 75. 
 7 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 35 (2002). 
 8 Id. 
 9 Douglas D. McFarland, Self-Images of Law Professors: Rethinking the Schism in 
Legal Education, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 232, 232 (1985). 
 10 BRUCE A. KIMBALL, THE INCEPTION OF MODERN PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION: C.C. 
LANGDELL, 1826-1906 192 (2009). 
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With the change in the means of entry into the legal field, 
some observers, including U.S. Attorney General Harlan F. Stone, 
later a member of the U.S. Supreme Court,11 were concerned that, 
while law school was more the norm for prospective lawyers, not 
all schools had high standards. This phenomenon was “the 
development in the United States of two distinct types of law 
school.”12 Stone suggested that one type of law school, the 
university law school, had “high entrance requirements and 
exacting educational standards,” while the other type, often the 
night or part-time school, had “low admission requirements, low 
educational standards and on the whole low professional ideals.”13 
In general, the teacher at the university was a scholar of law, 
while the teacher at the night or part-time school was a 
practitioner of law. 
The American Bar Association (ABA), which itself had 
expressed concern for “‘creat[ing] conditions which [would] tend to 
strengthen the character and improve the efficiency of those 
admitted to the practice of law,’”14 spoke to concerns like those of 
Stone by addressing standards for legal education in the United 
States. In 1921, the ABA’s Section of Legal Education and 
Admissions to the Bar recommended, and the ABA then accepted, 
that every candidate for bar admission should have graduated 
from a law school that had the following standards: two years of 
college as a prerequisite, three years for full-time law study or 
longer for part-time law study, an adequate library available for 
law students, and a large enough number of faculty members who 
would devote their full attention to the law school.15 This action by 
the ABA effectively recognized the scholar’s “claim to primacy in 
teaching law” because the ABA was endorsing the university law 
school, and the scholar was a key player within the university law 
school.16 Additionally, the ABA recommended that, after 
graduation from an appropriate law school, a candidate should 
                                                                                                             
 11 Harlan F. Stone, The Future of Legal Education, 10 A.B.A. J. 233, 233 (1924). 
 12 Id.  
 13 Id. 
 14 Conference on Legal Education, 7 A.B.A. J. 637, 637 (1921). 
 15 Id. at 637-38. 
 16 John Henry Schlegel, Between the Harvard Founders and the American Legal 
Realists: The Professionalization of the American Law Professor, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
311, 317 (1985). 
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have to take “an examination by public authority” before joining 
the bar.17 
In light of this ongoing evolution of U.S. legal education from 
law office study toward university law school study, this Article 
explains how, from 1920 to 1960, the role, or persona, of the law 
professor in the United States remained a situs of considerable 
rhetorical controversy. On one hand, lawyers used rhetoric to 
continue to promote a persona, that of a scholar, appropriate for 
the law professor situated within the university, a context suitable 
for the professionalization of law. On the other hand, different 
lawyers like Judge Jerome Frank used rhetoric to critique, often 
in a scathing manner, the scholar persona and put forth their own 
persona, that of a practitioner, as a more appropriate model for 
legal education. Beginning at 1920, where prior scholarship 
concluded an examination of the development of the scholar 
persona of the law professor as a new phenomenon in U.S. legal 
education,18 the current Article takes 1960 as an ending point 
because, during the 1960s, law schools finally entered a new era 
by discursively thinking of themselves as graduate programs of 
study.19 
To develop the argument, the Article will draw upon 
rhetorical theory and present persona theory and persona analysis 
as a means of conducting this study. Next, the Article will 
consider the then-established persona of the law professor as 
scholar and in turn the alternative persona of the law professor as 
practitioner. For this study, the term lawyers will refer to 
practicing lawyers and judges as well as academic lawyers. Given 
that, to this day, law paradoxically remains a program of 
academic study within the university that purports to prepare 
students for practical careers, the insights from the rhetorics 
between 1920 and 1960 remain important to understanding 
present-day legal education. 
                                                                                                             
 17 Conference on Legal Education, supra note 14, at 638. 
 18 See generally Pedrioli, supra note 4. 
 19 Thomas F. Bergin, The Law Teacher: A Man Divided Against Himself, 54 VA. L. 
REV. 637, 649 (1968). 
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I. PERSONA THEORY AND PERSONA ANALYSIS20 
This section of the Article addresses the theory and 
methodology for the present study. More particularly, the section 
looks to rhetorical theory for a discussion of persona theory and 
persona analysis. 
Persona theory helps to inform the discussion of a law 
professor persona suitable for law as an academic field. This 
theory addresses the roles, or personae, that communicators create 
in discourse.21 At least four types of personae can be present in 
discourse, including the first, second, third, and fourth personae.22 
However, given the focus of this Article on the first persona of the 
law professor, this section will concentrate on the first persona. 
The second, third, and fourth personae, which deal with 
audiences, will not receive attention here. 
The first persona is “the constructed speaker/writer or ‘I’ of 
discourse.”23 Such a persona is “‘the created personality put forth 
in the act of communicating’”24 and allows the communicator to 
identify with the audience.25 In literature, the first persona is the 
speaker or character a writer creates in the course of crafting 
writing like poetry or fiction.26 In a way, a first persona is a 
rhetorical mask that the communicator chooses to wear as he or 
                                                                                                             
 20 An expanded version of this discussion of persona theory and persona analysis 
appeared in Pedrioli, supra note 4, at 65-69. The author of that article has retained 
copyright to the article. 
 21 Paaige K. Turner & Patricia Ryden, How George Bush Silenced Anita Hill: A 
Derridian View of the Third Persona in Public Argument, 37 ARGUMENTATION & 
ADVOC. 86, 88 (2000). 
 22 Id.; Edwin Black, The Second Persona, 56 Q. J. SPEECH 109, 112 (1970); Philip 
Wander, The Third Persona: An Ideological Turn in Rhetorical Theory, 35 CENT. 
STATES SPEECH J. 197, 209 (1984); and Charles E. Morris, Pink Herring & the Fourth 
Persona: J. Edgar Hoover’s Sex Crime Panic, 88 Q. J. SPEECH 228, 230 (2002). 
 23 Turner & Ryden, supra note 21, at 88. 
 24 Paul Newell Campbell, The Personae of Scientific Discourse, 61 Q. J. SPEECH 
391, 394 (1975) (emphasis omitted) (quoting WALKER GIBSON, PERSONA: A STYLE 
STUDY FOR READERS AND WRITERS xi (1969)). 
 25 Walter G. Kirkpatrick, Bolingbroke and the Opposition to Sir Robert Walpole: 
The Role of a Fictitious Persona in Creating an Audience, 32 CENT. STATES SPEECH J. 
12, 12 (1981). 
 26 Emory B. Elliott, Jr., Persona and Parody in Donne’s The Anniversaries, 58 Q. J. 
SPEECH 48, 49 (1972); Campbell, supra note 24, at 391 (observing that “[t]he term is 
used to mean the imaginary, the fictive being implied by and embedded in a literary or 
dramatic work”). 
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she performs rhetorically, and because the persona at issue is a 
mask, the persona is not necessarily the communicator himself or 
herself.27 For example, Martin Luther King, Jr., assumed in his 
discourse against civil rights violations the persona of a prophet, 
although despite his skillful performance King was not necessarily 
an actual prophet.28 
The existing corpus of research on first personae has focused 
predominantly on the performance of personae communicators 
select.29 Although some communicators might create their own 
first personae,30 many communicators employ first personae 
already in existence. In the case of King, the chosen persona was 
that of a prophet.31 Because the scholarly interest has tended to be 
what communicators do with the assumed personae, scholars 
often have ignored much or all of the process of the creation of 
rhetorical personae.
 
Along this line, scholars who have conducted persona 
analyses32 of performance of first personae have not explored in 
depth situations in which communicators create, or continue to 
create, in their discourse first personae for future use.33 While in 
certain cases the two concepts of construction and performance of 
first personae can function together, distinguishing between two 
major types of first personae is necessary. On one hand, a 
                                                                                                             
 27 Thomas O. Sloan, The Persona As Rhetor: An Interpretation of Donne’s Satyre 
III, 51 Q. J. SPEECH 14, 14, 26 (1965) (noting that, for example, one should “not confuse 
the persona with [the poet]”). 
 28 Campbell, supra note 24, at 394. 
 29 See, e.g., B. L. Ware & Wil A. Linkugel, The Rhetorical Persona: Marcus Garvey 
As Black Moses, 49 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 50, 56-61 (1982); Campbell, supra note 24, at 
394; John L. Pauley, Reshaping Public Persona and the Prophetic Ethos: Louis 
Farrakhan at the Million Man March, 62 W. J. COMM. 512, 522-23 (1998); Phyllis M. 
Japp, Esther or Isaiah?: The Abolitionist-Feminist Rhetoric of Angelina Grimké, 71 Q. 
J. SPEECH 335, 337, 339-43 (1985); Craig R. Smith, The Persona of Jesus in the Gospel 
According to St. Matthew, 14 J. COMM. & RELIGION 57, 59-63 (1991); Laura Severin, 
Becoming and Unbecoming: Stevie Smith As Performer, 18 TEXT & PERFORMANCE Q. 
22, 32 (1998); Karrin Vasby Anderson, Hillary Rodham Clinton As ‘Madonna’: The Role 
of Metaphor and Oxymoron in Image Restoration, 25 WOMEN’S STUD. COMM. 1, 19 
(2002); and Nneka Ifeoma Ofulue, President Clinton and the White House Prayer 
Breakfast, 25 J. COMM. & RELIGION 49, 55-61 (2002).  But see Pedrioli, supra note 4, at 
79-80. 
 30 Kirkpatrick, supra note 25, at 22. 
 31 Ware & Linkugel, supra note 29, at 61; Campbell, supra note 24, at 394. 
 32 Smith, supra note 29, at 64; Turner & Ryden, supra note 21, at 90. 
 33 But see Pedrioli, supra note 4, at 79-80. 
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communicator can select and assume a persona in his or her 
communication. The focus of study in this situation is on the 
performance, so it is appropriate to think of this type of first 
persona as a first persona performed (FPP). On the other hand, 
the communicator might create the persona, which the 
communicator or a different communicator might employ in 
subsequent discourse. The idea is the creation of a discursive tool 
for later implementation. This additional type of first persona is a 
first persona constructed (FPC). The theoretical distinction allows 
critics to focus more on either the performance or the construction 
of first personae. 
The present FPC study involves identification of the various 
traits of the law professor for which, between 1920 and 1960, 
lawyers argued in their writings and organization of such traits 
into categories of personae. For instance, such traits include 
participating in full-time teaching and research, as well as having 
extensive practical experience in lawyering. These traits may be 
more scholarly or more pragmatic in nature. When considered 
together, the particular characteristics within artifacts offer an 
outline of the law professor persona that communicators put forth. 
The texts for this current research come from a search of 
HeinOnline. This electronic database contains law review articles 
that date back to the nineteenth century. For example, the 
database contains the first issue of the American Law Register, 
which debuted in 1852 and later became the University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review.34 Although HeinOnline does not 
necessarily contain all law reviews, the database does contain 
hundreds of law reviews, including law reviews at some of the 
most influential law schools. A critical advantage of the database 
is that, unlike databases such as Westlaw and LexisNexis, 
HeinOnline contains numerous articles that date back to the early 
and mid twentieth century, which is essential for a study focused 
on the era from 1920 to 1960. Hence, because it dates back so far, 
HeinOnline proved to be an appropriate database for this 
particular study. 
The search in HeinOnline identified any law review article 
that contained the terms law and professor in the title. Many such 
                                                                                                             
34 1 AM. L. REG. (1852); STEVENS, supra note 1, at 128 n.34. 
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articles, although not all, would be likely to address the subject of 
this current study, but these articles would not necessarily 
provide a comprehensive listing of relevant articles since the 
discourse may have appeared in articles that did not focus 
exclusively on the law professor. To increase the number of 
appropriate articles identified, the search included locating 
relevant articles cited in the footnotes of the articles that resulted 
from the HeinOnline search. Accordingly, while the texts located 
for this study are by no means all of those relevant to the topic, 
they are both broad in their historical origins and not necessarily 
limited to articles that focused exclusively on the law professor. 
II. THE LAW PROFESSOR PERSONA – SCHOLAR V. PRACTITIONER 
Applying persona theory to the texts identified for the study, 
this section of the Article examines the two main personae that 
lawyers put forth in their rhetoric between 1920 and 1960. The 
discussion focuses on the persona of the law professor as scholar 
and the persona of the law professor as practitioner.35 
A.  The Law Professor As Scholar 
The law professor as scholar model, which Christopher 
Columbus Langdell and James Barr Ames of Harvard Law School, 
along with other like-minded lawyers, had promoted to the legal 
field between 1870 and 1920,36 retained crucial importance 
between 1920 and 1960. During this latter period, various lawyers 
argued in favor of the merits of this scholar persona, including 
how the persona was quite different from that of the judge or 
practicing attorney, but controversy still remained. In general, the 
scholar persona had major dimensions that included (1) an almost 
exclusive professional commitment, (2) teaching duties, (3) the 
production of research, and (4) a public function. As in the period 
from 1870 to 1920, this scholar version of the law professor 
                                                                                                             
 35 Other than a few items like Jerome Frank’s brief comment that the law 
professor might continue to practice law while teaching, this particular study did not 
locate rhetoric that suggested scholar/practitioner hybrid models of the law professor. 
See Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 921 
(1933) [hereinafter Frank, Why Not]. 
 36 See Pedrioli, supra note 4, at 69-75. 
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persona was multidimensional, which is one possibility for a first 
persona.37 
First, pro-scholar lawyers argued that the law professor 
should devote almost all professional time to the university. For 
instance, Learned Hand of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit made such an argument,38 as did Chief Justice 
William Howard Taft of the U.S. Supreme Court39 and Karl N. 
Llewellyn of Columbia University Law School.40 Taft justified the 
position that he, Hand, Llewellyn, and others took by claiming 
that full-time work in the practice of law while one held 
employment in a law school would prove to be a large distraction 
from one’s scholarly duties.41 Carl C. Wheaton of the St. Louis 
University Law School argued from the position of having been an 
associate dean at a practitioner-taught law school that active 
practitioners had “almost no time to prepare lectures” for class.42 
Because time was so short for the legal practitioner, the law 
professor had to be available full-time for teaching law students 
and assuming other duties. Accordingly, the law professor persona 
should be that of a full-time individual. 
Second, advocates of the scholar persona argued that the law 
professor persona should have a teaching dimension. Roscoe 
Pound of the University of California, Los Angeles, Law School 
stated, “If one’s main interest is in anything but his teaching he 
will be no teacher.”43 According to Pound, some of the ideal 
qualities in teachers were “a sense of their high calling as lawyers 
and as teachers of law, devotion to duty, and putting forth of their 
powers to the utmost in the work of the law school and the service 
of the students.”44 By comparison, Hand suggested that members 
of the bench and bar were “not competent as teachers,” so the 
                                                                                                             
 37 Smith, supra note 29, at 63. 
 38 Learned Hand, Have the Bench and Bar Anything to Contribute to the Teaching 
of Law?, 24 MICH. L. REV. 466, 466 (1926). 
 39 William Howard Taft, Legal Education and the University Law School, 10 MINN. 
L. REV. 554, 555 (1926). 
 40 K. N. Llewellyn, On What is Wrong with So-Called Legal Education, 35 COLUM. 
L. REV. 651, 658 (1935). 
 41 Taft, supra note 39, at 556. 
 42 Carl C. Wheaton, Law Teaching and Pragmatism, 25 GEO. L. J. 338, 344 (1937). 
 43 Roscoe Pound, Some Comments on Law Teachers and Law Teaching, 3 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 519, 532 (1951). 
 44 Id. at 530. 
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teaching function of the law professor was special.45 This approach 
clearly assigned teaching to the persona of the law professor 
rather than to the personae of other members of the legal field, 
and, in doing so, the approach omitted many of the practical 
aspects of law that experienced judges and practicing lawyers 
might bring to the classroom. 
Third, pro-scholar advocates claimed that, because teaching 
was not enough, the law professor persona should have a research 
dimension. Noting, in 1926, that “reports during the last quarter 
century are proof enough of . . . an increasing tendency to accept 
as authoritative the conclusions of the great writers” on the law, 
Hand described the research dimension of the law professor 
persona as having “preeminence.”46 William Prosser, dean at the 
University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, recalled many 
applicants for law professorships who had never written much, if 
anything, scholarly in nature.47 Prosser noted that individuals 
who were interested in teaching law but not interested in writing 
about law had “the wrong approach” to entering the legal 
academy, and Prosser, as well as probably most law school deans, 
would not have been likely to hire such candidates.48 
Several other points about this research-oriented dimension 
of the law professor persona are of note. For example, Harold Gill 
Reuschlein of Georgetown University Law School added that a 
legal researcher should be well “grounded in the law and other 
disciplines.”49 Also, good research involved a professor’s ability to 
make important contributions to the academic legal literature; 
such contributions would not necessarily involve quantity but 
instead quality.50 Observing a relationship between the research 
and teaching dimensions of the law professor persona, Pound 
maintained that research would be a source of inspiration for 
teaching.51 Research, then, would aid a professor’s work in the 
classroom. 
                                                                                                             
 45 Hand, supra note 38, at 466. 
 46 Id. at 468. 
 47 William L. Prosser, Advice to the Lovelorn, 3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 505, 511 (1951). 
 48 Id. at 511-12. 
 49 Harold Gill Reuschlein, Law Professor–Post-War, 30 MINN. L. REV. 68, 69 (1946). 
 50 Id. at 71-72; Pound, supra note 43, at 532.  
 51 Pound, supra note 43, at 532. 
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James Willard Hurst of the University of Wisconsin Law 
School offered an important justification for the need for research 
to be a key dimension of the law professor persona. Writing in the 
late 1950s, Hurst conceded that law schools were supposed to 
develop law graduates who would be able to practice law, but he 
also pointed out that the law school, by then well established 
within the university system, had a duty to contribute to one of 
the main functions of the university,52 which one might describe 
as “the production of knowledge.”53 In light of this point, Hurst 
called for renewed vigor in university law school research that 
would contribute to the university’s aim of enhancing 
humankind’s knowledge of the world, including the legal world.54 
Fourth, pro-scholar advocates maintained that the law 
professor persona should have a public function dimension. Hand 
argued that the law professor would provide guidance to the bench 
and bar for a clear statement of “a doctrine, with a complete 
knowledge of its origin, its authority and its meaning.”55 Hand 
even went so far as to state that because the law professor 
assumed a persona that was “less prone” to align itself with “the 
side of wealth,” the law professor might be better suited “to solve 
new questions” of doctrine.56 Also in terms of the public function 
dimension, a law professor had to help bring “about better 
requirements for admission to the bar.”57 One might assume that 
such improvements would aid both the legal field and the public. 
For purposes of comparison, while the law professor persona 
was that of “the scholar,” the persona of someone on the bench or 
at the bar was that of “the man of affairs.”58 Members of the bench 
and bar heard cases and practiced law, respectively, but they did 
not assume the personae of scholars. Rather, members of the 
bench and bar would handle the cases that might “stimulate an 
                                                                                                             
 52 James Willard Hurst, Research Responsibilities of University Law Schools, 10 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 147 (1957). 
 53 JAMES ANDERSON, COMMUNICATION THEORY: EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS 
146 (1996). 
 54 Hurst, supra note 52, at 161. 
 55 Hand, supra note 38, at 468. 
 56 Id. at 471. 
 57 Pound, supra note 43, at 519. 
 58 Hand, supra note 38, at 482. 
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excessive fertility of invention” in the minds of legal scholars.59 
Again, although different members of the legal field might work 
toward a “common enterprise of keeping and advancing the law,”60 
each individual had a different persona to assume. 
During the 1920s, 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, this rhetoric of a 
law professor persona with the dimensions of an almost exclusive 
professional commitment, teaching duties, the production of 
research, and a public function echoed the rhetoric of Langdell, 
Ames, and their colleagues from the fifty-year period before 1920, 
but one minor modification began to appear in the law professor 
as scholar model after 1920. Some limited practical experience 
became more acceptable in the background of the law professor 
persona. For instance, Taft admitted that some practical 
experience might be of value to the law professor persona.61 
Prosser observed that for various courses law schools were looking 
“for some practice before teaching, some experience of some kind 
in the field.”62 As an estimate, Prosser indicated that three years 
of practical experience would be “about right” for the future law 
professor.63 Wheaton felt that in some cases fewer than five years 
might be appropriate.64 Suggesting that only a poor law faculty 
would have absolutely no professors with practical experience, 
Reuschlein noted that some legal experience was beneficial.65 
Indeed, the professor ought to “become familiar with at least the 
ordinary problems that arise in practice.”66 
If one were to think that the emerging acceptance of some 
limited practical experience in the background of the law professor 
persona was a major addition to the scholar model, consideration 
of a response from Prosser would be appropriate. Prosser quite 
sharply pointed out the following: “One thing on which all law 
schools are in agreement is that too many years of practice 
hardens the arteries, stunts the intellect, and ossifies the ideas, so 
that few lawyers over the age of fifty are ever much of a success 
                                                                                                             
 59 Id. at 472. 
 60 Id. at 480. 
 61 Taft, supra note 39, at 555. 
 62 Prosser, supra note 47, at 513. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Wheaton, supra note 42, at 345. 
 65 Reuschlein, supra note 49, at 72-73. 
 66 Wheaton, supra note 42, at 346. 
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when they retire and enter teaching.”67 It seems that the 
acceptance of a few years of practical legal experience proved to be 
a small concession to the lawyers who had been advocating the 
practitioner model of the law professor persona. Indeed, the 
essence of the scholar model of the law professor persona 
remained. Langdell, Ames, and their allies would have been 
pleased with this continuing promotion of their model. 
B. The Law Professor As Practitioner 
Regardless of the above-noted general affirmation of the law 
professor persona as essentially that of a scholar, sharp resistance 
to that position remained. One of the strongest voices, although 
not the only voice, against the law professor as scholar model 
came from Jerome Frank, a federal appellate judge who took more 
than one opportunity to speak his mind on this matter. Indeed, in 
1947, Frank observed that he had been calling for a different type 
of legal education, which included an alternative law professor 
persona, for the past fifteen years.68 
In attempting to advance this alternative persona, Frank and 
his colleagues maintained (1) that the scholar model generally did 
not address the needs of legal education adequately and (2) that 
the practitioner model was much better suited for legal education. 
The ensuing discussion examines the arguments for such a 
practitioner persona. 
To make his argument that the scholar persona was 
inadequate for legal education, Frank placed legal education 
within its historical context as he saw it. Going back to the days of 
Langdell, whom Frank called “a brilliant neurotic,”69 Frank 
claimed that “[d]ue to Langdell’s idiosyncracies, law school law 
came to mean ‘library-law.’ ”70 Langdell’s teaching method “was the 
expression of the strange character of a cloistered, retiring bookish 
man.”71 Under the Langdellian paradigm of legal education, the 
law professor would become one who “had little or no contacts 
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with or a positive distaste for the rough-and-tumble activities of 
the average lawyer’s life.”72 Indeed, this approach to teaching law 
was akin to teaching future horticulturists through the use of cut 
flowers or future physicians without the expertise of individuals 
“who had seldom seen a patient or diagnosed the ailments of flesh-
and-blood human beings.”73 One also might compare the 
Langdellian approach to teaching law with teaching “toe-dancing, 
swimming, automobile-driving, hair-cutting, or cooking wild 
ducks” by merely talking about them and having students read 
about them.74 Thus, to Frank’s chagrin, practical experience was 
not a major dimension of the law professor persona that legal 
education favored.75 
Frank and other lawyers who agreed with his position 
further critiqued the scholar model. For instance, Frank suggested 
that a law school that adopted the scholar model forced law 
professors who had substantial practical experience to capitulate 
“to an atmosphere in which the memories of practice became 
shadowy and unreal.”76 In class, the professor with legal 
experience had “to belittle his experience at the bar.”77 Irving M. 
Mehler of the Colorado Bar and the New York Bar asked, “How 
can a teacher deem himself competent to project in a live and 
compelling way, if he himself has never been confronted with not 
one or a few, but with many live legal problems?”78 To this, Arch 
M. Cantrall of the West Virginia Bar added that often the 
idealized scholarly professor of the day was “just fresh from the 
doors of some law school,”79 and Albert K. Orschel of the Illinois 
Bar suggested that producing scholarship did not necessarily help 
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students learn the practice of law.80 Naturally, critics of the 
scholar persona saw this situation as problematic because the 
students would not benefit from the practical experience of a 
professor. 
Taking a different angle on legal education, Frank and his 
colleagues offered a position in sharp contrast to the one that the 
pro-scholar lawyers took. Rather than favoring “experience in 
learning law,”81 Frank favored looking beyond “rules and 
principles” of cases and toward two main tasks of the lawyer, 
which included predicting future court decisions in particular 
lawsuits and trying to persuade courts in given cases to render 
decisions favorable to one’s clients.82 Mehler reminded the legal 
field that “the primary purpose of a law school [was] to train 
lawyers.”83 Upon leaving law school, lawyers had to be ready for 
the experiences of the “first year or two of practice,” as Cantrall 
noted.84 Indeed, if new lawyers learned law while beginning to 
practice, clients would have to pay the price.85 This understanding 
of law school and legal practice helped explain why, at some point, 
the law student needed to observe what transpired in law offices 
and in court.86 
Accordingly, Frank and other lawyers promoted a different 
version of the law professor persona, that of a practitioner. One 
might call such a persona that of “a ‘live’ lawyer.”87 First and 
foremost, Frank maintained, the law professor should assume a 
persona endowed with practical experience, and by that he meant 
“not less than five to ten years of varied experience in the actual 
practice of law.”88 Mehler suggested that at least seven years of 
practical experience might suffice.89 This practical experience 
would come from litigating in the trial and appellate courts, 
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working in the office, dealing with clients, and negotiating.90 Such 
experience would be that of individuals “who ha[d] drafted 
contracts, . . . tried and defended tort actions, . . . drafted wills and 
trusts, . . . handled corporate matters, . . . foreclosed mortgages, . . . 
quieted titles, . . . defended those accused of crime, . . . had 
experience in trial and appellate practice, and . . . counseled 
clients regarding ordinary and difficult legal problems.”91 Indeed, 
the law professor might even continue to practice law while 
teaching.92 Regardless, the law schools should make “[e]xtensive 
use of practitioners in every law school course.”93 
Such practical experience as a part of the law professor 
persona would help the law professor enhance personal credibility, 
or ethos, with law students and thus enhance the learning 
experience of the students.94 Mehler argued that when a teacher is 
lacking in “the practical touch,” students have less regard for the 
professor and in turn lose interest in the professor’s subject.95 
However, when “the practical touch” is present in the learning 
environment, “the subject glows, the respect and admiration for 
the instructor is heightened, and even a supposedly ‘dead’ subject 
becomes very much alive.”96 Indeed, ethos can have a relationship 
with persona.97 In this case, the practitioner persona of the law 
professor would enhance the ethos of the individual who assumed 
that persona, and the benefit would be a better learning 
environment for the students. 
Lawyers who accepted this position maintained that the law 
professor who assumed the practitioner persona ought to teach 
students the practical aspects of law. One such venue for this 
teaching was the legal clinic.98 To illustrate the benefits of the 
practitioner persona, Frank listed several insights that law 
students would gain from clinical instruction. These insights 
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included learning about how juries decide cases, the uncertain 
nature of facts, the nature of how witnesses impact parties’ legal 
rights, influences on judicial decision-making, negotiations and 
settlements, and drafting client documents.99 While learning 
appellate law was an aspect of learning law, it was not the most 
important aspect because “upper courts . . . are relatively 
unimportant for most clients.”100 Frank pointed out that “the 
overwhelming majority of lawsuits are never appealed, and, in 
most of the small minority which are appealed, the appellate 
courts accept the facts as ‘found’ by the trial court.”101 He added, 
“In most suits, no disagreement arises about the rules, and the 
disputes relate solely to the facts.”102 Besides, Frank argued, 
“Intelligent men can learn [criticism of appellate cases] in about 
six months.”103 
Mehler extended Frank’s argument by explaining how law 
students would learn from more realistic experiences in the 
classroom as well as in the clinic. For instance, a professor who 
had assumed a practitioner persona might bring to class a set of 
articles of incorporation that the professor had drafted and with 
which the professor was familiar.104 Other examples would be 
documents for matters that related to “wills, contracts, 
partnership, property, and many other courses.”105 Under this 
approach, the student would be able to engage actual legal 
drafting and benefit from a “touch of realism.”106 In the end, “the 
student [would] have had a taste of real law.”107 
In addition, Frank added that the law professor could draw 
from other fields in order to enhance the education of future legal 
practitioners. As a good legal realist, he proposed that the law 
professor call upon the social sciences and other allied fields so as 
to instruct law students in “the inter-actions of the conduct of 
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society and the work of the courts and lawyers.”108 Frank 
explained that “the vaguest recollections of [one’s] pre-legal work” 
provided for “an insufficient feeling of the inter-relation between 
law and the phenomena of daily living, and an artificial attitude 
towards ‘Law’ as something totally distinct and apart from the 
facts.”109 
Critics of the scholar persona of the law professor did concede 
that their approach would allow some law professors to assume an 
exclusively scholarly persona.110 Nonetheless, law schools should 
not primarily focus on developing future law professors; the 
schools ought to focus on developing future lawyers.111 As such, 
“the ‘library-law’ teacher should cease to dominate the schools,”112 
and the law schools should back away from “Langdell’s morbid 
repudiation of actual legal practice.”113 
While very much invested in the hands-on aspects of the 
practitioner persona of the law professor, various lawyers who 
supported this position were careful to clarify that their vision of 
the law professor was not necessarily one that called for a purely 
trade school approach to legal education. Rather, the law professor 
would assume the practitioner persona in a context that would 
blend “[k]nowledge of what courts and lawyers do” and “visual 
demonstration of the possible values of a rich and well-rounded 
culture in the practice of law.”114 Indeed, some scholarship was 
appropriate in the law school, too.115 This was a view of “a realistic 
lawyer-school.”116 However, although Frank and his colleagues 
were willing to allow for a minor academic touch to their version 
of the law professor persona, their focus was on the practical 
aspects of the law professor persona. Based on the above rhetoric, 
one can conclude that these lawyers wanted law students to 
emerge from law school as practice-ready graduates. 
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During this period in history, few individuals heeded the call 
for reform in legal education,117 which included significantly 
altering the nature of the Harvard version of the law professor 
persona. The few individuals who may have listened to Frank and 
his allies refused to allow practicality to be at the center of legal 
education or at the core of the law professor persona.118 This 
phenomenon suggested that the understanding of the law 
professor persona as that of a practitioner was out of touch with 
the understanding of the law professor persona as that of a 
scholar, the latter of which held a position of prominence in legal 
education.119 
CONCLUSION 
As this Article has illustrated, in the sample of texts from the 
conflict over the ongoing rhetorical construction of the first 
persona of the law professor between 1920 and 1960, two 
competing personae appeared. These were the law professor as 
scholar persona and the law professor as practitioner persona. 
Essentially, the scholar model, which was dominant,120 remained 
largely unchanged from the period between 1870 and 1920, except 
that advocates of this model made the minor concession that some 
limited practice before a lawyer assumed a professorship may 
have been acceptable for the law professor persona. Meanwhile, 
the practitioner model, complete with its focus on helping to foster 
practice-ready law graduates, remained much the same as it had 
between 1870 and 1920, but some advocates of this model did 
make the slight concession that law school could be more than just 
training for legal practice. Nonetheless, Frank maintained, “Our 
law schools must learn from our medical schools. Law students 
should be given the opportunity to see legal operations.”121 
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Any small concessions aside, the dividing line between 
advocates of the scholar model and advocates of the practitioner 
model was clearly the background of the persona of the law 
professor. From one perspective, the law professor should assume 
a scholarly persona and fit comfortably within the university 
setting, yet from another perspective, the law professor ought to 
work to help develop students into legal practitioners. This 
tension between the values of intellectualism and practicality, 
present during the period from 1870 to 1920, remained during the 
period from 1920 to 1960, but the law school was now firmly tied 
to the university system.122 
At a theoretical level, this discussion of how the persona of 
the law professor in the United States remained a situs of 
considerable rhetorical controversy from 1920 to 1960 has 
provided an additional example of the benefits of addressing the 
first persona from a slightly different angle. While most of the 
prior communication research on the first persona focused on the 
performance of a pre-existing persona like that of a prophet, the 
current study has supported the limited amount of research that 
has illustrated in detail how communicators can fill volumes in 
the act of rhetorically constructing, or continuing to construct, a 
persona. This distinction is one between the FPP and the FPC. 
The theoretical distinction allows critics to focus more on either 
the performance or the construction of first personae, although 
performance and construction are not mutually exclusive. 
In light of the strong scholarly impulse of the times, lawyers 
like Frank were voices crying out in the wilderness of legal 
education.123 For the most part, with law school situated in the 
university, the pleas of Frank and others were ignored. Frank 
explicitly lamented, “No one has ever paid much attention to [my] 
views.”124 Indeed, he was aware that, in making his case for the 
practitioner persona of the law professor, he was “thinking 
wistfully that perhaps this time some of [his] audience [would] not 
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dissent.”125 Rather than dissent, the audience essentially failed to 
listen to the message, and today the plea for a practitioner 
persona of the law professor, grounded in serious legal experience 
and capable of providing law students with a practical education, 
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